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Abstract 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rescued over 110,000 people in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea between 2015 and 2017. From 2017, EU member states and agencies 
increasingly criminalized these organizations, accusing them of ‘colluding with smugglers’ and 
acting as a pull factor. In this climate, as Italy, Malta and the EU increased cooperation with Libya 
to stop people from taking to the seas, many suspended their operations. This article explores the 
search and rescue efforts of NGOs in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2014 and 2018. We 
examine the criminalization of this NGO activity and argue that it is made possible through an 
oscillating neo-colonial imagination of the sea as mare nostrum and mare nullius, our sea and 
nobody’s sea, respectively. We build on the work of other scholars who have pointed to the 
activation of the Mediterranean as ‘empty’ in response to migration flows, erasing the historical 
connections of colonialism, empire, trade, and exchange in the Mediterranean as well as the 
contemporary legal geographies that govern the space. Here, we go further to develop the idea of 
a neo-colonial sea, which is alternately imagined as empty and ‘European’. We explore how NGOs 
disrupt these depictions, as well as the disappearing figures of the migrant and refugee amidst the 
contestations between NGOs and states. 
 
 
Keywords: solidarity, Mediterranean Sea, migration, neo-colonialism, non-governmental 
organizations, search and rescue 
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Introduction 
Between 2015 and 2017, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rescued over 110,000 people in 
the Central Mediterranean (Guardia Costiera, 2018: 19). From the initial ship launched by the 
Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) in late 2014, the ranks of this humanitarian fleet swelled 
by 2016 to include Cadus/Lifeboat, Jugend Rettet, Médecins Sans Frontières, Mission Lifeline, 
Proactiva Open Arms, Save the Children, Sea-Eye, Sea-Watch, and SOS Méditerranée.1 Despite 
established cooperation with Italy’s Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome, the 
organizations were increasingly criminalized by Italy, other EU member states, and EU agencies. 
In 2017, an Italian prosecutor accused the groups of ‘colluding with smugglers’ (BBC 2017a), 
while Frontex (2017: 32) labelled their activities a pull factor. The Italian state seized and 
impounded the ships of both Jugend Rettet and Proactiva Open Arms in August 2017 and March 
2018, respectively. It continues to hold Jugend Rettet’s ship and has launched investigations into 
the crew members from both organizations for ‘conspiring with smugglers’ (Tondo and Jones, 
2018).  
 
The 2018 national election in Italy saw the far-right Lega rise to power in alliance with the anti-
establishment Five Star Movement. Italy subsequently refused entry to most NGO ships trying to 
disembark people they had rescued. Malta followed suit and declared their ports shut to NGO ships, 
a day after they charged Claus-Peter Reisch, captain of the Lifeline, with multiple offences and 
impounded his ship after he successfully disembarked 234 people. Shortly afterwards, the Maltese 
government grounded Sea-Watch’s spotter plane and refused their ship permission to leave port 
(Vassallo, 2018). As a result of the criminalization by EU governments, no NGO ships remained 
operational in July 2018. Moreover, while these organizations were responsible for 40 percent of 
people rescued in 2017 and up to May 2018, deaths rose sharply after they suspended their 
operations: at least 721 people drowned in the Central Mediterranean in June and July 2018 
(Amnesty International, 2018: 5).2 Indeed, in 2018, as NGOs were forced off the sea, the rate of 
death more than doubled: one person died for every 38 people who arrived in Europe from Libya 
in 2017, while in 2018, one in 14 people died (UNHCR, 2019). 
 
 
1 Others, such as Boat Refugee Foundation, Greenpeace and the Swedish Sea Rescue Society, operated in the 
Aegean Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
2 Such statistics are always lower than the actual number of deaths, as many die without being counted. 
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Since 2018, NGOs have managed to disembark a number of people in Italy and Malta, often only 
after long standoffs while EU states argue over responsibility. Yet, the criminalization of NGO 
search and rescue (SAR) activity at sea continues and is part of moves to criminalize acts of 
solidarity with migrants more generally, in Europe and beyond. Martina Tazzioli (2018) 
demonstrates how EU states have criminalized these forms of help, such as in the case of the French 
olive farmer, Cedric Herrou, who helped people cross the French-Italian border. Similarly, those 
engaging in rescue at sea, even tangentially, have been accused of smuggling: Greek officials 
arrested two Danish and three Spanish volunteers in 2016 and charged them with human 
smuggling. In 2017, Italy launched an investigation into the Italian-based Eritrean priest, Father 
Mussie Zerai, who was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and whose telephone number has been 
a lifeline for people crossing the Mediterranean over the past 15 years. Helena Maleno Garzón, a 
Spanish national living in Morocco, has also been under criminal investigation in Spain and 
Morocco for allegedly ‘aiding and abetting illegal immigration’ (Fekete et al, 2019: 12-13). 
Although in most cases charges have been dropped or defendants acquitted, EU states have 
attempted to deter migrant solidarity work at sea and on land by branding activists as criminals or 
smugglers, despite the lack of financial exchange involved (Amnesty International, 2020b; Fekete 
et al, 2019).  
 
In this article, we argue that the criminalization of NGO activity at sea is made possible through an 
oscillating neo-colonial imagination of the sea as mare nostrum and mare nullius, our sea and 
nobody’s sea, respectively. We build on the work of other scholars who have pointed to the 
activation of the Mediterranean as ‘empty’ in response to migration flows, erasing the historical 
connections of colonialism, empire, trade, and exchange in the Mediterranean as well as the 
contemporary legal geographies that govern the space (e.g. Giuliani, 2016; Heller and Pezzani, 
2014; Mainwaring, 2019: 61-72; Stierl, 2016: 564-565). Here, we go further to develop the idea of 
a neo-colonial sea, which is alternately imagined as empty and ‘European’.   
 
Seas have been socially constructed in different and contested ways for millennia: from an 
extension of land to its antithesis, an empty non-territory (Steinberg, 2001). In the 17th century, 
Hugo Grotius (1609) defined the high seas as res communis, a common space that was 
unpossessable but in need of stewardship. The principle survives today, and since World War II, 
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states have developed an increasingly detailed legal system to regulate the seas: they have expanded 
their territorial waters, created exclusive economic zones, and divided the world’s oceans into 
search and rescue zones. Simultaneously, international law has expanded to create intersecting 
rights and obligations for states and private actors at sea. Grotius (1609) himself underlined that 
freedom on the high seas also involved an obligation to obey ‘the law of hospitality’, which today 
involves the duty to assist those in distress and allow for their disembarkation in a place of safety. 
A principle of customary international law that dates back centuries, this duty was also codified in 
treaty law throughout the latter half of the 20th century, including in the 1974 Convention on Safety 
of Life at Sea, the 1979 Search and Rescue Convention, and the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. Paradoxically, this expansion of international law on the high seas has 
resulted in more sovereign competition, rather than more protection for migrants at sea, a space 
now characterised by a ‘complex web of joint, overlapping and clashing assertions of authority’ 
(Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2014: 445).  
 
We are interested in the ways in which, despite these legal obligations, legacies of imperialism 
reverberate in the contemporary moment as state and EU actors construct the sea as vast, lawless 
and ungovernable, but then reassert control over the space. These erasures and reclamations of the 
Mediterranean and its histories condemn racialized people to violence and death, while denying 
freedom of mobility. Such social constructions of the sea contribute to the suppression of particular 
histories, excluding racialized others from narratives of ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’, and 
reinscribing the Mediterranean Sea as the limit between ‘European civilization’ and its ‘others’ (cf. 
ODwyer, 2018). As De Genova (2018: 1778) notes, ‘we must begin to take stock of the multiple, 
inherently inconsistent and contradictory ways in which “European”-ness itself is (re-)articulated 
precisely as a racial formation of postcolonial whiteness’. 
 
The social construction of the Mediterranean as an empty space, alongside the associated spectacles 
of enforcement and humanitarianism, allows the EU and its member states to avoid responsibility 
for deaths at sea, while framing migration flows as an ahistorical ‘crisis’ and projecting an image 
of Europe as a coherent, unified body with an altruistic, civilized core and a hard border (De 
Genova, 2016; Mainwaring, 2019: 7-13). NGO activity at sea disrupts these constructions to 
different degrees. By occupying this symbolic border site, they illustrate Europe’s complicity in 
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the deaths of thousands of people at its edge, making visible the violence of border controls and 
contesting their conception as a form of protection (cf. Monforte 2016: 412-414). The 
criminalization of NGO activity thus exposes the limits of Europe’s humanitarianism and illustrates 
the persistent neo-colonial imaginations of the Mediterranean as mare nostrum.  
 
After outlining methods and terminology, we turn to our conceptual starting point of the 
Mediterranean as a neo-colonial space. Drawing on Black Mediterranean scholarship, we first re-
examine the sea through its colonial history and connect this to the contemporary neo-colonial 
constructions of the sea as mare nullius and mare nostrum. We then trace the rise of NGOs in the 
Central Mediterranean from late 2014 and the ways in which they disrupted this narrative. The next 
section examines the initial efforts by Italy, Malta and the EU to criminalize these groups in 2017 
and 2018. We analyse how social constructions of the sea allowed NGOs to enter this space, as 
well as enabled their subsequent criminalization. We argue here that by criminalizing NGOs at sea, 
the EU and its member states reasserted their control over the Mediterranean, claiming it as mare 
nostrum. In the final section, we turn to the disappearing figures of the migrant and refugee amidst 
the contestations between NGOs and states. 
 
Methods and Terminology 
We base our analysis on separate qualitative research projects on migration and border control in 
the Central Mediterranean, which we carried out over the last 15 years and which included 
extensive interviews with policy makers, NGOs, border guards, and migrants. DeBono (2011; 
2013) has studied migration to southern Europe since 2007. Most recently (2015-2019), she 
conducted a four-year, multi-sited ethnographic study of first reception of boat migrants and 
borderwork in Lampedusa, Malta and Sicily (DeBono, 2019a; 2019b), which included a focus on 
SAR activities in the Central Mediterranean, disembarkation ports and first reception migrant 
centres. 
 
Mainwaring (2012; 2016; 2019) has studied migration across the Mediterranean since 2005. From 
2007-2017, she conducted extensive fieldwork in Malta in particular, examining migrant journeys 
to this southern European island, as well as Maltese and EU responses to migration (Mainwaring, 
2019). The fieldwork included interviews with migrants, policymakers, border guards, detention 
` 
 
6 
and open centre staff, fishermen and NGO representatives. Mainwaring also conducted participant 
observation in migrant centres. She continues to conduct interviews and participant observation in 
Malta, with people engaged in migration practices and policies, including with SAR NGO activists.  
 
In our work, we use the term ‘migrant’ as a broad umbrella for the people moving across the 
Mediterranean space and seeking a better life in Europe. Many of these people will apply for 
asylum. Some will receive some form of refugee status. Here, we try and avoid replicating the 
bureaucratic, violent language of states that reduces people to ‘asylum seekers’ or ‘irregular 
migrants’. This language filters people into hierarchical categories of deservingness, while 
simultaneously obscuring the power-laden, historically contingent mechanisms that categorise 
people and their behaviour. Indeed, where possible we speak of these people not as ‘migrants’ 
(another state category) but as people, on the move, with families, dreams, and agency. 
   
Re-Imagining Mare Nostrum: Colonial Echoes across the Black Mediterranean  
Throughout the 19th century, Britain and France colonized different parts of the Mediterranean, 
establishing their empires and in doing so conceiving of the Mediterranean as ‘a geographically 
united, historically unique and essentially European space’ (Borutta and Gekas, 2012: 4). Spain 
and Italy, among other European powers, joined the ‘scramble for North Africa’ in the 20th century, 
drawing on the mare nostrum discourse of the Roman Empire to legitimise their violent exploits. 
These powers constructed the sea not as a divide but as a space connecting metropolis and colony 
(Borutta and Gekas, 2012: 2-4).  
 
Characterising the sea as the ‘Black Mediterranean’, scholars have recently sought to unearth these 
histories and connections, including Europe’s complicity in slavery, highlighting in particular how 
the Mediterranean slave trade paved the way for the transatlantic slave trade (e.g. Danewid, 2017; 
Hawthorne, 2017; Smythe, 2018). They return to the work of Cedric Robinson (2000) who argues 
that the Black Mediterranean was a precondition for the Black Atlantic, and that its purging from 
European history constructs Europe as a ‘racially discrete entity’ (quoted in the introduction by 
Robin DG Kelley, p. xiv).  
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Scholarship on the Black Mediterranean demands that we acknowledge the connections between 
the present and past, between histories of colonialism and present-day migration among other 
things. For instance, European nationhood is shaped by the continent’s imperial histories, which 
saw European states colonize and subjugate, before retreating and restricting the movement of 
people from those former colonies (Davies and Isakjee, 2019: 215; Danewid, 2017). Restrictions 
on movement were achieved through immigration policies established on the basis of the colour of 
those who moved. Indeed, colonial violence can be traced into the present through immigration 
controls (Bhambra, 2017: 401; cf. El-Enany, 2020) and, as Mbembe (2003: 17) argues, ‘race has 
been the ever present shadow in Western political thought and practice, especially when it comes 
to imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples’. 
 
The contemporary struggles over mobility in the Mediterranean can thus be understood as by-
products of ‘the ruins of empire’, global inequality, military interventions, and capitalism (Davies 
and Isakjee, 2019: 215; Stoler, 2013: 13). The majority of those who cross the sea to seek asylum 
come from countries that were until recently under colonial rule. Moreover, as Camilla Hawthorne 
(2017: 166) reminds us, ‘the black Mediterranean is no longer just a precondition for modern racial 
capitalism; it is being reproduced every day at the nexus of anti-black violence (seen in immigration 
policy, citizenship law, and everyday racism) and black liberation struggles across the 
Mediterranean basin.’  
 
Today, people regularly cross the Mediterranean, one of the world’s busiest and most monitored 
seas, a sea bustling with cargo, cruise liners and war ships. Yet, EU states continue to script the sea 
as a neo-colonial space, oscillating between depictions of it as mare nostrum and mare nullius. For 
example, the Italian government launched Operation Mare Nostrum in October 2013. The year-
long ‘military humanitarian’ operation saved over 150,000 people and revived the imperial Roman 
name mare nostrum or ‘our sea’, which was also a rallying cry at the height of Italian nationalism 
during the period of unification and during the era of fascism. At both these times, it was an explicit 
call to territorial expansion and ‘reclamation’ of former colonies (Smythe, 2018: 5). Echoing this 
history, Operation Mare Nostrum projected Italian power across the Central Mediterranean in the 
21st century and included patrols near the Libyan coast.  
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Similarly, at the regional level, Alun Jones (2011: 41) has argued that European policy elites 
imagine the Mediterranean region as Europe’s back yard, ‘as [a] fragmented, problematic, and 
often conflictual space; a space in which the European Union regards itself as having a natural 
legitimacy to act in order to ensure its own security…’ Thus, when Italy ended its Mare Nostrum 
Operation, EU Commissioner Malmström welcomed its replacement, Frontex’s Operation Triton, 
stating: ‘The Mediterranean is a European sea and a European responsibility’ (EU Commission, 
2014). The so-called ‘migration crisis’ in 2015 reinforced this imaginary, working to construct the 
Mediterranean as ‘a space of action by specific “response-able”—read European—actors’ 
(Pallister-Wilkins, 2016: 313; cf. Van Reekum, 2016).		 
 
We are interested in how the colonial trope continues in instances when the sea is activated as 
nobody’s sea in order to shift responsibility for rescue. We use the idea of mare nullius3 as a mirror 
to terra nullius, a ‘legal fiction’ and colonial justification of the land as wilderness, a space that is 
neither possessed nor acted upon by humans (Fitzmaurice, 2007; Hendlin, 2014; Pannell, 1996). 
Throughout much of the 21st century, Italy and Malta have activated the Mediterranean as mare 
nullius, empty, vast, and lawless, in their disputes over responsibility for people in distress. Despite 
the development of an increasingly detailed legal system to regulate the seas since World War II 
and the long-standing legal duty to rescue those in distress, international law remains ambiguous 
on disembarkation. Malta maintains that boats rescued within its SAR area should be disembarked 
at the nearest safe harbour, often the Italian island of Lampedusa. Italy, however, maintains that 
disembarkation should occur in the state responsible for the SAR area (i.e. Malta). The states have 
exploited the legal loophole that allows them to maintain these contradictory positions in order to 
limit their SAR activities and shift blame when deaths inevitably result (cf. Klepp, 2011; Fink and 
Gombeer, 2018). In late 2013, as Italy embarked on its Mare Nostrum Operation in the wake of 
hundreds of deaths at sea, there was a hiatus in this conflict. Italy struck a secret deal with Malta 
and agreed to rescue people throughout the Central Mediterranean and disembark them. However, 
by 2017, this informal agreement between the two countries was unravelling as the Italian 
coastguard operations chief lambasted Malta for limiting its search and rescue operations and 
denying requests for disembarkation (ANSA 2017). 
 
 
3 For previous work on mare nullius, see Giuliani, 2016; Mainwaring, 2019; Pannell, 1996. 
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In Malta, much of the political discourse has revolved around Malta’s small size relative to its large 
SAR zone, the perceived differences between bordering land and sea, and the perceived ‘burden’ 
that Malta thus faces (Mainwaring, 2019: 65-72). Framing its SAR zone as exceptionally vast in 
relation to the island state’s size enables blame to be shifted when migrants die at sea, to Libya for 
‘allowing’ their departure, to the EU for their lack of ‘solidarity’, and even to the voyagers 
themselves for taking to the sea. Nevertheless, Malta has consistently rebuffed suggestions that it 
should relinquish parts of its SAR region, which coincides with its highly profitable Flight 
Information Area. In this way, it reasserts ownership over the space. Prime Minister Joseph Muscat 
(2017) also echoed the EU’s mare nostrum rhetoric at the end of Malta’s EU presidency in 2017, 
saying, ‘Our seas should be a force to unite the world. Our vision for the world must be to build 
bridges, not walls’ (emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, in Italy, the lament for many years has been the undue burden the EU places on the 
country in terms of SAR activities and asylum processing (e.g. Ministero dell’Interno, 2014). 
Politicians have pointed, for example, to the fact that the country spent €9 million every month on 
the Mare Nostrum Operation. Yet, the country has also been interested in asserting its power over 
the Mediterranean space, branding itself as ‘the Mediterranean state par excellence’ (Ben-
Yehoyada, 2011: 387). Indeed, the EU’s renewed focus on controlling migration across the 
Mediterranean re-ignited Italy’s interest in the sea and region, especially its desire to position itself 
as a key partner in its management (cf. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation, 2017: 1-3). For example, when the EU finally launched Operation Triton, although it 
was a much smaller operation than Mare Nostrum, Italian Minister Angelino Alfano presented it 
jubilantly as an Italian achievement: ‘L’Europa per la prima volta scende in mare, e sara a presidio 
delle frontiere / For the first time, Europe takes to the sea, and will be guarding the borders’ 
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2014).  
 
In line with EU policy, Italy and Malta have responded to deaths at sea with calls to strengthen 
borders and externalize controls to Libya, in effect reducing the Mediterranean to a dividing line 
and erasing the struggles over mobility occurring there. Even after one of the deadliest shipwrecks 
in October 2013 and admission by the EU Council (2013) that ‘actions … are needed to avoid such 
tragedies’, the response focused on strengthening border control, rather than rescue at sea. Unlike 
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Operation Mare Nostrum which included patrols throughout the Central Mediterranean and was 
the largest SAR effort seen in the Mediterranean to date, its replacement, Operation Triton, was 
smaller by design because of unsubstantiated accusations by Frontex (2014) and others that Mare 
Nostrum had acted as a pull factor. Triton was initially limited to operating only 30 nautical miles 
from the Italian and Maltese coasts and did not involve ongoing patrols but rather responded to 
distress calls (Heller and Pezzani, 2016).  
 
Italy and Malta have also long held that the answer to deaths at sea is strengthening border controls 
in Libya. In the wake of the Libyan civil war and NATO intervention, Italy and the EU financially 
supported Libya’s establishment of a Maritime Coordination Centre and SAR area in 2017, despite 
a chorus of criticism of Libya’s coastguard and its inability to provide robust search and rescue 
(Human Rights Watch, 2018). Indeed, since 2015, Italy and the EU have provided Libya with 
money and training for detention centres and its coastguard, and generally feted the coastguard as 
an EU partner, despite evidence that it cooperates with smugglers and is involved in torture and 
other inhumane and degrading treatment (EU Council, 2018). The EU’s cooperation with Libya 
has also been denounced as contrary to the principle of non-refoulement in particular when it results 
in refugees being forcibly returned to Libya, which is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention. 
Nevertheless, Italy extended its Memorandum of Understanding with Libya in February 2020, a 
move condemned by Amnesty International (2020a) who stated, ‘Under the deal, Italy helps Libyan 
maritime authorities to stop boats at sea and return people to detention centres in Libya where they 
are unlawfully detained and face serious abuse, including rape and torture’. A secret deal between 
Malta and Libya to similarly facilitate interception and return of migrant boats was revealed a few 
weeks later (Sansone, 2020).  
 
At the EU level, Frontex has also focused on externalizing border controls, thus erasing the sea and 
the daily contestations taking place there. For instance, in Frontex’s (2019: 38) annual report on 
2018, there is no mention of the sea or the NGO ships, while the Libyan coast guards’ ‘uptick in 
activities’ is noted as a key factor in preventing departures. The NGO presence at sea is only 
mentioned in the 2016 report as a ‘pull factor’ (Frontex, 2017). The following year, the report 
describes state ‘search and rescue operations covering vast areas of the Mediterranean Sea’ 
(Frontex, 2018: 9, emphasis added).  
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This social construction of the Mediterranean as nobody’s sea, mare nullius, allows the EU and its 
member states to easily shift blame for deaths at sea. The many thousands of people dying at the 
edge of the EU are labelled a ‘tragedy’ and explained with reference to natural elements like the 
wind and waves, smugglers, NGOs, and even migrants themselves, depicted as irrational for taking 
unfathomable risks in crossing the sea or moving too quickly to one side of their boat when a rescue 
vessel approaches (e.g. Loveluck and Phillip, 2015; Renzi, 2015; Schulz, 2014). Erased are the 
ways in which EU policies and practices encourage the dangerous journeys people make across the 
Mediterranean, and produce deaths at sea by closing off legal channels and externalizing border 
controls (Heller and Pezzani, 2017; Mainwaring, 2019). In the next section, we turn to how NGOs 
entered and disrupted this space. 
 
Solidarity in the Mediterranean 
The Catrambones, an American-Italian millionaire couple based in Malta, founded the Migrant 
Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) in 2013. The following year, MOAS chartered a ship, the MY 
Phoenix, and became the first non-governmental organization dedicated to search and rescue in the 
Mediterranean. By 2016, the ranks of this burgeoning humanitarian fleet had grown to include SOS 
Méditerranée, Sea-Eye, Sea-Watch, Jugend Rettet, Proactiva Open Arms, and Save the Children. 
The NGOs consisted of both established organizations, like MSF and Save the Children, as well as 
smaller organizations, like Sea-Watch, founded by four German families expressly for the purpose 
of search and rescue in the Mediterranean (Cusumano, 2017a; Stierl, 2018). 
 
MOAS’s initial mission in 2014 and the subsequent proliferation of NGO ships at sea took place 
as Italy ended its year-long ‘humanitarian-military’ operation, Mare Nostrum. As was predicted, 
the smaller Frontex operation that replaced it resulted in more deaths at sea. It also relocated the 
burden of rescue: in the first half of 2015, commercial ships were responsible for 33 percent of 
rescues (Cuttitta, 2018: 638). In the face of increasing deaths and sustained criticism, the EU 
expanded Operation Triton and launched a naval mission, Sophia, with the aim of disrupting 
smuggling networks and stemming departures from Libya. At the same time, the number of NGOs 
at sea increased. As a result, during the second half of 2015, commercial ships were responsible 
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for only 10 percent of rescues in the Central Mediterranean  and one percent across the entire 
Mediterranean (Cuttitta, 2018: 638-39; Tgcom24, 2018). 
 
Both implicitly and explicitly, NGO activity at sea shed light on the limited number of EU forces 
deployed under Frontex’s Triton operation and the EU’s naval mission. They constituted an 
important new form of monitoring on the high seas, where oversight of government activity had 
previously been limited to migrant accounts, readily dismissed by policymakers. By demonstrating 
that even small groups of private citizens could make a significant difference in search and rescue, 
some NGOs sought to shame Europe and to reveal how EU missions had limited operational 
capacity by design. To different degrees, the groups pointed to the EU’s complicity in deaths at sea 
and how their migration policies encouraged dangerous voyages and smuggling. 
 
Indeed, as Maurice Stierl (2018) has argued, the activities of these different NGOs both challenge 
and reproduce the EU’s border practices and discourse. The organizations hold ‘divergent 
imaginaries and discursive framings of what is at stake in the maritime borderzone and of how they 
understand their own interventions’ (Stierl, 2018: 715). Some, like MOAS are firmly embedded in 
a humanitarian business model and as such have been complicit in framing the ‘problem’ as merely 
a lack of EU resources, compounded by unscrupulous smugglers. The group framed the 
outsourcing of humanitarian rescue to private entities as a technical solution to deaths at sea, a logic 
that also runs through their for-profit work with military contractors. Their focus on the corporeal 
rescue of people at sea, with little concern for the violence of detention and deportation that awaits 
many of them in the EU, reproduces a ‘limited and limiting notion of humanity’ (Ticktin, 2006: 
42; cf. Pallister-Wilkins, 2017; Stierl, 2018: 715-717).  
 
In contrast, other organizations, especially smaller groups like Sea-Watch and Jugend Rettet, have 
framed deaths as a product of EU policies and practices that close off legal avenues. Exposing and 
denouncing the violence of the European border regime is thus integral to their work, with some 
explicitly connecting to wider freedom of movement struggles. Rather than acting to patch up 
Europe’s border practices, they operate in the Mediterranean to conduct rescue but also to monitor 
and hold EU forces accountable (Stierl, 2018: 718-719; Cuttitta, 2018). Although not physically 
present at sea, the Watch the Med Alarm Phone runs a hotline for people in distress and has assisted 
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over 2,700 boats (Alarm Phone, 2019). Initiated in 2014, the network thus similarly works to assist 
people at sea while also playing a key monitoring role, informing coastguards of boats in distress 
and applying pressure when rescue is not forthcoming (cf. Stierl, 2016). Indeed, even when NGO 
boats were unable to operate at sea, the Alarm Phone continued their work, making cases of distress 
at sea visible and calling on states to rescue and disembark. In recent years, as the relationship 
between these states and NGOs at sea has deteriorated, the Alarm Phone has been a crucial source 
of information for the organizations, providing details for instance of distress cases at sea.  
 
Regardless of their motivations and politics, the effectiveness of this humanitarian fleet was evident 
by the end of 2016: that year, NGOs were involved in over 20 percent of search and rescue 
operations in the Central Mediterranean (EU Commission, 2017a: 4). During this time, NGOs 
cooperated closely with the Italian authorities, including Rome’s Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre (MRCC) responsible for coordinating rescue, and the Ministry of Transport responsible for 
giving permission to dock and disembark.  
 
Criminalizing Solidarity at Sea 
Yet, by the end of 2016, the political atmosphere had turned decidedly against these group and 
their activities were increasingly delegitimized and criminalized. Frontex (2017: 32) characterized 
NGO activities as a ‘pull factor’ that encouraged people to cross and ultimately drown in the 
Mediterranean Sea. In Italy, the groups also came under attack. The chief prosecutor of Catania 
accused them of ‘colluding with smugglers’ to destabilize the Italian economy. Salvini, the leader 
of the far-right Lega, called for their ships to be destroyed and employees arrested, while the Five 
Star Movement branded them a migrant ‘taxi service’ (Momigliano, 2017; cf. Cuttitta, 2018). By 
May 2017, courts in Palermo and Trapani were investigating crew members. The NGOs 
vehemently denied the accusations of collusion and researchers pointed to a lack of evidence to 
substantiate such claims (e.g. Heller and Pezzani, 2017).  
 
Nevertheless, the atmosphere only intensified over the next few months. In July 2017, Italy 
threatened to close its ports to NGO ships (BBC, 2017a). It then drafted a ‘Code of Conduct’ that 
it insisted all rescue NGOs should sign. While MOAS, Proactiva, and Save the Children complied, 
the majority of NGOs refused, including MSF, Jugend Rettet, Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, and SOS 
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Méditerranée (Reuters, 2017). These groups criticized the Code for replicating many of the 
international obligations they already adhered to, as well as introducing two new provisions that 
would undermine their operations. First, the Code required the presence of a police officer on all 
NGO ships ‘for information and evidence gathering with a view to conducting investigations 
related to migrant smuggling and/or trafficking in human beings’ (Italian Ministry of Interior, 
2017). Second, it prohibited the transfer of rescued people between ships at sea, effectively limiting 
the operations of smaller, often more critical NGOs, like Sea-Watch, that regularly transferred 
people onto larger ships before continuing their rescue work (Cusumano, 2017b). 
 
On August 1st, 2017, Italy seized and impounded Jugend Rettet’s ship, Iuventa, one day after the 
group refused to sign the Code of Conduct. The Italians accused the German NGO of having 
contact with Libyan smugglers and using the ship ‘to aid and abet illegal immigration’ (Dearden, 
2017). A week later, Italy and Malta refused to allow Proactiva to disembark three Libyans rescued 
under the direction of Malta’s Coordination Centre (ANSAMed, 2017). That month, the Libyan 
government in Tripoli formerly established a SAR area, with Italian support, and threatened to fire 
on NGO ships sailing too near its coastline. In mid-August, a Libyan vessel intercepted Proactiva’s 
ship and ordered it to sail to Tripoli or risk being fired upon (BBC, 2017b). Libyan coastguard 
officials also approached MSF’s Bourbon Argos, fired several bullets and then boarded and 
searched the vessel. In early September, Libyan coastguards seized Sea-Eye’s speedboat, forcing 
it and the two crew members to dock in Tripoli (Cuttitta, 2018: 647-48). 
 
In this climate, MSF suspended their operation in the Mediterranean, tweeting ‘We refuse to be co-
opted into a system that blocks people from seeking safety and protection.’4 Other groups followed. 
MOAS suspended their operation in September, releasing one of their most overtly political 
statements: ‘MOAS does not want to become part of a mechanism where there is no guarantee of 
safe harbor or welcome for those being assisted and rescued at sea’ (MaltaToday, 2017). Save the 
Children also suspended their mission after Italian police searched their ship, as part of wider 
investigations into NGO activity at sea. The organization’s Director General condemned EU 
 
4 The group continued, however, to partner with SOS Méditerranée, first on the Aquarius and then on the Ocean 
Viking. In 2020, this partnership ended due to political differences and MSF launched a new partnership with Sea-
Watch. 
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policies, saying ‘For too long we have been the substitution for the inexistent and inadequate 
European policies for search and rescue and for hosting migrants’ (Scherer, 2017).  
 
Italy and Malta have adopted various tactics to prevent NGO ships from carrying out rescue: Malta 
used relatively minor procedural issues, such as raising questions about vessel registration. 
Although NGOs maintain that they are operating within the law, and that such state actions are 
politically motivated, challenging governments involves long-winded legal procedures, which 
would see them out of action for long periods. In this way, Maltese Prime Minister Muscat tried to 
walk a fine line between maintaining a humanitarian image and criminalizing NGOs. On the other 
hand, Italy resorted to much bolder political moves, adopting explicit rhetoric that painted NGOs 
as criminals and shutting their ports to any ship carrying migrants.  
 
Obstructing the work of SAR NGOs is not only demoralising for organizations run primarily on 
volunteer labor, it also jeopardizes their funding as they rely on donations generated by their 
activities (cf. Cusumano, 2017a: 96). Indeed, by 2018, the attacks on NGO activities had the desired 
effect. Only three groups remained at sea in March: Sea-Eye’s Seefuchs, the Aquarius operated by 
SOS Méditerranée, and Sea Watch 3 (ANSA, 2018). The national election in Italy that month 
turned the tide even further. The new government, formed between the far-right Lega and the anti-
establishment Five Star Movement, upped the ante against NGOs operating at sea and ultimately 
closed their ports to them in June 2018. 
 
The criminalization of humanitarian work is not a new phenomenon, nor limited to solidarity 
activities in the Mediterranean Sea.5 Nevertheless, the criminalization of NGOs at sea comes at a 
crucial time for the EU. The rise of the far right has been well documented across the continent and 
migration has become a flashpoint for the struggle over Europe (De Genova, 2016). The 
criminalization of NGOs also began as Italy and the EU intensified their efforts to externalize 
 
5 For example, on the US-Mexico border, providing water for travellers has similarly been criminalized as the 
borderzone desert has also been characterized as ‘empty’ (Associated Press, 2018; Doty, 2011). In the Mediterranean, 
a German humanitarian organization, the Cap Anamur, rescued 37 people in 2004. The Italian government refused 
them entry for two weeks, eventually allowing disembarkation but also arresting the ship’s captain and first officer and 
charging them with ‘illegal immigration’. They would only be acquitted five years later (Cuttitta, 2018: 637-38). In 
2007, Italian officials similarly arrested seven Tunisian fishermen and charged them with smuggling after they rescued 
44 people. Thus, even before NGOs operated at sea, Mediterranean states have tried to deter mariners from carrying 
out rescue (Albahari, 2016: 100-103). 
` 
 
16 
migration controls to Libya in 2017 (Tazzioli, 2018: 5). Despite the ebb and flow of migrant 
arrivals, European leaders continue to prioritize the externalization of EU borders to Libya and 
elsewhere, using the same rhetoric of ‘saving lives’ to justify attempts to close routes across the 
Mediterranean as well as out of some of the world’s poorest countries (Howden and Zandonini, 
2018; Moreno-Lax, 2018). Cooperation with Libya has increased, despite the chorus of criticism 
pointing to the severe human rights abuses occurring in the country. In this geopolitical context, 
NGOs are constructed as enemies as they act as critical monitoring forces, revealing the EU’s 
politics of neglect that cause deaths at sea and the Libyan coastguard’s violence against migrants 
and NGOs. The next section examines how the construction of the sea as antithetical to land and 
as an empty space both allowed for the NGOs to enter the space as well as for their subsequent 
criminalization. We argue that by criminalizing NGO presence at sea, states and the EU reasserted 
their control over the Mediterranean, claiming it as mare nostrum. 
 
From mare nullius to mare nostrum  
Despite clear legal obligations to rescue, and the fact that the sea is ‘a key site where borders and 
border enforcement are proliferating’ (Mountz and Hiemstra, 2012: 455), when it comes to migrant 
vessels, the Mediterranean Sea is often presented as empty of these regulations by states. Indeed, 
the sea is imagined as an empty space where states hold little responsibility and migrants only 
contend with the physical elements of the sea, their own physical bodies, and smugglers as legal 
geographies and actors at sea—EU forces, commercial vessels, etc.—are erased (Stierl, 2016). As 
William Walters (2008: 5) observes:  
[H]owever much the ocean may have been striated by the modern forces of commerce, 
geo-politics and international law, however much it has been rendered predictable, 
navigable, exploitable, etc. by these interventions, there exist circumstances under 
which the ancient idea of the high sea as a lawless space beyond sovereignty and justice 
is capable of being reactivated.  
 
NGOs entered this imagined and carefully crafted void from late 2014. By deploying vessels, they 
filled the space and reminded the public, both directly and indirectly, of the relative ease of 
conducting more robust SAR missions. Some, like Sea-Watch, were explicit in their condemnation 
of the EU and its complicity in migrant deaths. Such groups provided an important counter 
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narrative to the government discourse that constructed the sea as mare nullius. Although migrants 
had long disputed government narratives of the sea as empty, pointing to for instance the many 
ships that did not respond to their distress signals and the deadly delay tactics used by Italian and 
Maltese officials to avoid rescue (Gatti, 2017; Mainwaring, 2016), the NGOs at sea were less easy 
to dismiss.  
 
Despite challenging sovereign narratives to different degrees, these organizations nevertheless 
began their operations with relative ease and cooperated closely with the Italian Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre between 2014 and 2016. Indeed, even as they came under increasing attack 
from political elites, they continued to cooperate with the MRCC in order to carry out rescue. Their 
entry into the Mediterranean space in late 2014 can be explained in a number of ways. Crucially, 
Italy’s decision at the end of 2013 to reverse its policy of refusing disembarkation of people rescued 
in Malta’s SAR area allowed NGOs to operate knowing they could disembark in Italy (Cusumano, 
2017a: 94). MOAS, the first organization to charter a ship, was also one of the least politically 
problematic organizations for the EU and its member states. They framed their activities as 
apolitical and ‘purely’ humanitarian (Cuttitta, 2018: 640), a way for governments to outsource a 
service, avoiding any implication that the EU was complicit in deaths at sea. For example, before 
setting sail, MOAS (2015) stated, ‘We must take politics out of search and rescue. We must put 
saving lives at the top of the agenda’. They also established close cooperation with governments in 
Malta and Italy. MOAS’s presence opened the door for much more critical groups, like Sea-Watch 
and Sea-Eye. NGOs’ willingness to share information and operational practices also facilitated 
access to this space and allowed for a process of emulation (Cusumano, 2017a: 96-97). Regardless 
of how critical the groups were, their efforts as humanitarians also aligned with the EU’s discourse, 
if not its practice, as we discuss further below. 
 
The construction of this sea as antithetical to land, alongside the principle of free movement, also 
aided NGO entry into the Mediterranean space. Because the sea is constructed, legally and socially, 
as different to territory and territorial waters, control of actors is more limited: vessels may pass 
through areas outside territorial waters unheeded. The subsequent criminalization of NGOs was 
also possible due to the narrow, politicized frame of humanitarianism in the EU and the continued 
construction of the Mediterranean as mare nullius, the erasure of the historical connections of 
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colonialism, empire, trade, and exchange across the sea as well as of contemporary legal 
geographies. Indeed, NGOs are a constant reminder of the international laws that govern this space 
and thus a challenge to the social construction of the Mediterranean as mare nullius. Their presence 
allows them to bear witness in an area rife with trade, military, leisure and other activities. Armed 
with this knowledge and their first-hand experience, they challenge state narratives, using mass 
and social media in order to keep the spotlight on the Mediterranean.  
 
As Italy, Malta and the EU moved towards a partnership with the Libyan coastguard in their efforts 
to externalize migration controls, they increasingly associated NGOs with smugglers and deaths at 
sea while framing their own externalization practices as humanitarian measures to save lives (cf. 
Moreno-Lax 2018). The partnership with Libya included the establishment of the country’s SAR 
zone in 2017, similarly framed as a humanitarian measure as well as a reflection of Libyan 
sovereignty, despite widespread criticism that, due to the Libyan coastguard’s limited capacity and 
human rights record, the Libyan SAR zone was a legal fiction (Müller & Slominski, 2020; 
Maccanico, 2020). Indeed, the neo-colonial interests in controlling migration through ‘refoulement 
by proxy’ were made clear by Admiral Enrico Credendino, commander for operation Sophia, in 
2017:  
We will create a Libyan system capable of stopping migrants before they reach 
international waters, as a result it will no longer be considered a push-back because it 
will be the Libyans who will be rescuing the migrants and doing whatever they consider 
appropriate with the migrants (emphasis added, quoted in Liguori, 2019: 12).  
 
In this way, states reclaimed the Mediterranean as their sea. The 2018 national election in Italy 
resulted in increased state attacks against NGOs at sea. In mid-July 2018, there were no NGOs 
operating in the Central Mediterranean and over 600 people had drowned during the previous 
month—half of all deaths in 2018 (ECRE, 2018).6 As Maurice Stierl (2018: 5) has argued, 
‘EUrope’s humanitarian generosity extends, if at all, merely temporarily to migrant bodies within 
some parts of the sea—those beyond this delimited zone become subjected to registers of 
deterrence, policing, and expulsion.’  
 
6 Since then, some SAR ships have resumed operations despite continued criminalization. We return to this in the 
conclusion. 
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The Disappearing Figure: Migrants and Refugees in a Neo-Colonial Sea  
In this section, we examine the figures of the migrant and refugee within the construction of a neo-
colonial sea. Although NGOs challenge state characterizations of the sea as mare nullius and mare 
nostrum, their solidarity work is circumscribed by the space they operate within, the power 
dynamics that dominate that space, and their reliance on donations. Despite their efforts to resist 
the pitfalls of humanitarianism and their commitment to what Dadusc and Mudu (2020) call 
‘autonomous migrant solidarity’, they also risk reproducing colonial, racialized tropes of the 
saviour and the saved, as well as the sea as humanitarian zone and European space for intervention 
(DeBono & Mainwaring, 2020, forthcoming; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017; Van Reekum, 2016). In these 
humanitarian narratives, the figure of the refugee, with her associated human rights, slides from 
view as the saving of bodies from the sea takes centre stage. The figure of the migrant is 
intermittently activated in order to delegitimize mobility across the sea and justify externalization 
of migration controls. The criminalization of NGO activity has further displaced the figure of the 
refugee, as states home in on NGOs as part of their ‘fight’ against smugglers (Tazzioli, 2018: 6-8).  
 
Perkowski (2016) has argued that the movement of people across the Mediterranean reanimated 
the sea as a political space, defying the security and humanitarian logics of the European border 
regime. By ‘reasserting their agency, their wishes and hopes, political and social identities’, 
migrants proved to be the biggest challenge to European migration governance (Perkowski, 2016: 
333-334). In the face of this agency, a particular figure of the migrant is necessary in order to 
continue to depict Europe as saviour and protector, and NGOs as criminals abetting human 
smugglers and contributing to migrant deaths by encouraging the crossing. The figure of the 
migrant is thus distorted and reduced to that of a victim and an ‘other’ (cf. Schweppe & Sharma 
2015).   
 
Cuttitta (2015: 138) has similarly analyzed how migrants are framed as ‘inferiorized subjects’ and 
located a humanitarian turn in the Lampedusa shipwreck of October 2013, which he argues brought 
about a discursive shift from boat migrants being ‘intercepted’ or ‘apprehended’ to being ‘rescued’. 
This is echoed in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, which, despite its focus on increased 
border enforcement, the externalisation of border controls, and increased migrant returns, also 
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avows ‘to avert further loss of life’ and ‘to halt the human misery’, calling for ‘swift and determined 
action in response to the human tragedy in…the Mediterranean’ (EU Commission, 2015: 2-3). 
Cuttitta argues that although this appears to make the border more humane, what instead is taking 
place is a re-evaluation of human life. He captures the paradox by asking:  
But why is the human life of a migrant person only recognised as valuable after it has 
been devalued by restrictive border policies? Why do migrants deserve sympathy only 
when they die or risk their lives? Why are the dead–if only in words–granted Italian 
citizenship, while their surviving travel mates are investigated for illegal immigration? 
(Cuttitta, 2015: 132) 
 
NGOs at sea play an important role in this ‘re-evaluation’ of human life by contributing to and 
challenging the humanitarian narrative constructed by states. Indeed, between 2015 and 2018, the 
‘refugee crisis’ was often dominated not by discussions about migration but by discussions and 
images of humanitarian practices, including the rescue work of coastguards, NGOs, and others. 
The Mediterranean ‘crisis’ gave rise to the figure of the rescuer, an image constructed and fuelled 
by states and NGOs, albeit with different intentions and to different degrees, through media images 
of rescue, often depicting white Europeans pulling black people out of the sea. The focus on the 
rescuers ignores European policies that encourage people to make long and dangerous journeys, 
and the increasing militarisation and externalisation of EU borders. It also reproduces neo-colonial 
stereotypes of irrational black/brown people needing to be rescued by organised white Europeans. 
Crucially, it shifts the focus away from the people making these journeys.  
 
Even within a humanitarian framework, migrant life is devalued. Migrants are reduced to 
humanitarian subjects, helpless victims in need of rescue from ruthless smugglers, the physical 
elements at sea, ultimately from death. In this way, capture by the Libyan coastguard can be framed 
as ‘rescue’. This dynamic was evident from 2017 with the criminalization of NGOs. In reclaiming 
the sea as mare nostrum, states once again evoked a language of humanitarianism and protection 
in order to justify violent externalization practices to Libya and elsewhere. Moreover, as the EU 
and its member states were intensifying attacks on NGOs, they were simultaneously undermining 
the legitimacy of those who travel across the sea, characterizing them as ‘economic migrants’ rather 
than refugees (e.g. EU Commission, 2017b). For example, in 2017, EU Council President Donald 
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Tusk wrote to all EU heads of state asking for financial contributions to help train and equip the 
Libyan coastguard. In the letter, he emphasised the increase in ‘illegal arrivals’ in Italy. When 
questioned, he reiterated, ‘In most of the cases… we’re talking clearly and manifestly about 
economic migrants. They get to Europe illegally, they do not have any documents which would 
allow them to enter the European soil’ (Gutteridge, 2017). Another ‘inferiorized subject’, the figure 
of the migrant thus justifies deterrence and externalization. 
 
Conclusion   
Through their actions and words, NGOs have insisted on the primacy of the right to life and to 
mobility. In so doing, they re-assert the importance of the international law of the sea. Their 
criminalization by states exposes the extent to which this is in sharp contrast with European border 
policies, and how the oscillating constructions of the sea as mare nullius and mare nostrum are key 
to the development of European migration and border externalisation policies. Indeed, though 
paradoxical at first glance, mare nostrum and mare nullius reinforce each other in evoking a neo-
colonial sea, a space claimed by states as theirs to control and theirs to empty. Threats to this 
narrative must be quickly removed.  
 
The criminalization of NGO activity has shrunk the humanitarian fleet, as Italy, Malta, and the EU 
turn to containing people in Libya, despite the instability and widespread violence in the country. 
In 2019, over 9,000 people were intercepted at sea and returned to Libya. With fewer search and 
rescue operations, at least 1,262 people died trying to make the journey (Amnesty International, 
2020c: 17). Notwithstanding this, NGOs’ solidarity work in the Mediterranean contributes to an 
important alternative imaginary of the sea. Despite their criminalization and attempts by states and 
the EU to reclaim the Mediterranean as mare nostrum, the sea remains a contested space. Since 
2018, NGOs have persisted with rescue operations and developed new strategies in the face of 
continued criminalization. It is now common practice for Italy and Malta to deny entry to NGOs, 
leaving crew and passengers stranded at sea for weeks in many instances. Disembarkation is 
permitted only after lengthy and ad-hoc negotiations between member states secure the promise of 
resettlement of rescued passengers. Moreover, captains, like Carola Rackete, have been arrested 
and boats seized when disembarkation does eventually occur. In 2020, Italy and Malta exploited 
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the Covid pandemic to once again shut their ports to migrants and NGO ships. NGOs have thus 
had to fight for their right to conduct rescue missions through the courts and in the press.  
 
Facing closed ports in Italy and Malta, rescue NGOs also joined forces with civil society, activists, 
and representatives of European municipalities to call for safe harbours, sanctuary cities, and the 
right to mobility. For instance, in the 2018 Palermo Charter Process, they bridge contestations at 
sea with struggles that continue within Europe, in order to ‘prefigure and enact our vision of a 
society, in which we want to live’ (Alarm Phone 2018). Moreover, despite the militarization of the 
Mediterranean and the criminalization of NGOs at sea, people continue to journey across the sea, 
with thousands arriving ‘autonomously’ without the need for rescue. Thus, the sea remains a 
contested space, where solidarity work produces new imaginaries and people insist on the right to 
life and the right to move.  
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